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Abstract The study is designed to provide an informal summary of what is known
about consumer switching of health insurance plans and to contribute to knowledge
about what motivates consumers who choose to switch health plans. Do consumers
switch plans largely on the basis of critical reflection and assessment of information
about the quality, and price? The literature suggests that switching is complicated,
not always possible, and often overwhelming to consumers. Price does not always
determine choice. Quality is very hard for consumers to understand. Results from a
random sample survey (n = 2791) of the Alkmaar region of the Netherlands are
reported here. They suggest that rather than embracing the opportunity to be active
critical consumers, individuals are more likely to avoid this role by handing this
activity off to a group purchasing organization. There is little evidence that con-
sumers switch plans on the basis of critical reflection and assessment of information
about quality and price. The new data reported here confirm the importance of a
group purchasing organizations. In a free-market-health insurance system confi-
dence in purchasing groups may be more important for health insurance choice than
health informatics. This is not what policy makers expected and might result a less
efficient health insurance market system.
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Introduction
It is an essential assumption of market competition for health insurance that
consumers choose health insurance wisely and be willing to switch plans and/or
insurance companies if dissatisfied. The possibility of switching gives health
insurance companies the incentive to respond to consumers wishes for lower
priced policies and better quality. Health systems that have experimented with
consumer choice and switching include Denmark [7], Switzerland [71], and some
U.S. states. In 2006 the Netherlands replaced it mixed health insurance system
with a new market based, managed competition insurance system that permits
switching [22].
Switching is similar to choosing a health plan, but it is more demanding.
Choosing a health plan is a straightforward decision in the sense that it involves a
single decision-point-in-time. Switching behaviour implies a higher degree of
active consumer participation in the marketplace. It assumes that once an individual
has health insurance, she or he will continue, across an extended period of time, to
act in an ongoing monitoring-mode as regards health insurance options. The
underlying assumption is that patients will take action as a result of this pro-active
behaviour.
A decision to switch health insurance plans is considered to be the result of
informed individual choices made by rational actors inspired by self-interest [81].
The popular press takes for granted that ‘‘health care is a consumer market’’ and
that switching is central to the health sector. Health economists support this idea
though much of their assessment is theoretical rather than evidence-based [34,
87]; the notion of informed consumer choice is the foundation of Enthoven’s
notions of managed competition, regulated competition and competing integrated
delivery systems [22, 23]. Policy makers are told that patients would welcome the
opportunity to access information about their health insurance plan and their
health care providers so as to facilitate switching [17, p. 18]. Transparency of
performance in health care is developed with the construction of websites.
Computer-mediated transparency might offer people more choice and better
information [54].
Research outside the field of health care indicates that these strong expectations
about human behaviour might be unrealistic; rather, having extensive choices may
blunt one’s capacity to discern differences and act decisively [17].
The aim of this study is to describe switching health plans among consumers
in the new Dutch health insurance system. A further aim is to study factors
related to switching health plans. From a methodological perspective switching
behaviour is dynamic and can be studied through surveys that ask respondents
to reflect on past behaviour [37]. The exploration of the actual switching
behaviour with a survey among Dutch consumers is preceded by an
examination of the assumptions of switching in a competitive system. After
describing the design of a survey among Dutch consumers we present data on
switching health plans. In the conclusion the relevance of health plan switching
and the role of information are considered and lessons for modern health care
systems are examined.
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Assumptions About Switching
What is known about switching behaviour? To what extent are patients critical
consumers, willing to switch when the price is too high or quality too low?
It is a mistake to assume, as do many writing about switching, that switching
health plans is always an option. Health plan environments differ from country to
country and by different sectors of a given country. For example, in the U.S.
switching occurs most openly or directly by consumers in Federal Employee Health
Plans, Medicaid managed care and Medicare Advantage (private plans under
Medicaid and Medicare that are paid capitation, an alternative to direct fee-for-
service reimbursement to providers), and some private sector employer plans. But
switching is not necessary in some national, universal health insurance systems (UK
and Canada). The UK has been experimenting with several types of patient choices
but not with health insurance or plan choice, which is by definition impossible in the
National Health Service (NHS); patients can of course choose between providers
within the NHS [30]. In any case, ‘‘choice’’ between the private sector and the NHS
was part of the original plan and individuals may switch back and forth between the
two if they pay extra for it. In Canada, private health insurance is intended for
ancillary or supplemental services, rather than core health care.
Geography, employer preferences, and annual enrolment periods limit the
assumed opportunities for individuals to choose and switch health plans. In some
regions with health plan choice, switching may occur only at the option of the
employer, not the individual employee. For example, in the U.S. 60% of the
population has employer-based health insurance, but only about half of these U.S.
workers have a choice of more than one health insurance plan [19]. A sizable
majority (85%) of companies providing health coverage offer only one type of plan,
though larger firms are more likely to offer a choice—66% of large firms (200 or
more employees) restrict choice to only one plan type [43]. In addition, frequent
switching of health plans within an employer’s health insurance offerings is
discouraged, permitted only during a restricted time period for annual enrolment
[60]. Finally in several countries (such as the Netherlands) switching is limited to
once a year. Individuals are often overwhelmed by so many choices in many
economic sectors, including the health insurance sector [18, 76].
Individuals are assumed to embrace choice and the opportunity to switch health
insurance plans but ‘‘choices’’ in many economic sectors, including the health
insurance sector are overwhelming to many consumers [18, 76]. First, in these cases
some individuals develop shortcuts to simplify choices. While this may facilitate
switching, it does not always lead to the optimal or most rational choice [8]. In
Switzerland health plan choices were studied and ‘‘as the number of choices offered
to individuals grow, their responsiveness to price declines…’’ [31, p. 2]. This is
confirmed by research in the financial retirement sectors where more choices appear
to paralyze employees and lead to less cost-effective decisions [56].
Second, many consumers have mixed feelings about switching health plans. In the
U.S. 30% of consumers report that they ‘‘might switch’’ insurers, but only 6% have
done so in the recent past [17, p. 18]. From 2000 to 2005 37% of a sample of those
insured by a major Dutch health insurance company considered switching and the
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majority of these (65%) reported that they actually did switch companies [84].
Twenty percent of consumers in the Netherlands actually switched health insurance
plans in a single year when given the opportunity to do so in 2006 during a major
health system reform [70]. But switching in subsequent years was much diminished
to about 4% [39].
Third, a large gap exists between what patients say they need in terms of health
plan decision making aids and what they can meaningfully employ in making these
decisions [21]. Many consumers simply do not have the knowledge needed to make
such decisions [52] though a few do respond to quality information when making
choices [47]. Research suggests that consumers do not understand the meaning of
basic terms to make evidence-based choices such as ‘‘quality guidelines’’ [12].
Cognitive burden increases as choices increase: there are methods of presenting
material (less information, more summarized information) to lessen this burden for
persons with lower numeracy skills [64]. When it comes to choosing and switching,
many, though not the majority, say that they want their doctor to tell them what to
do. This is true of hospital choice in the Netherlands [48]. Others trust the advice of
friends, family and colleagues over any printed or online information, when forced
with the necessity of switching. ‘‘Personal sources of information are more
influential than impersonal sources [66, pp. 25–26])’’ Education designed to help
consumers learn to be rational to critically assess, choose and switch plans when
necessary, are not always effective [18].
Offering consumers financial incentives to make rational decisions is assumed to
be effective but evidence indicates that this is not always the case [18]. On the one
hand, in a laboratory experiment offering a financial reward to consider quality
factors, consumers demonstrated improvement in decision making ability that
resulted in switching when it was the optimal action [77]. There is, however, little
evidence that these findings are applicable to real world decision making [18].
Switching health insurance plans is sometimes assumed to be voluntary but this is
not necessarily the case. It is often involuntary, the result of changes that are
independent of individual choice. Studies suggest that switching related to ‘‘consumer
choice’’ accounts for only about a quarter of all switching in the U.S. and much
switching is not voluntary ‘‘choice’’ at all [14]. Aging, for example, may require
patients to change health insurance (in the US Medicare becomes available primarily
as a result of age change). And another U.S.-specific example: young people and
students are often excluded from parent’s health insurance plans when they reach a
certain age or leave school. People switch when they no longer qualify for a specific
government program such as Medicaid [59]. When an individual or families income
falls below the poverty line in the U.S. involuntary switching may occur as that
individual moves in and out of Medicaid eligibility standards which vary from state to
state. They are switched when they are discharged from the military or are released
from jail. Geographical mobility for whatever reason may also require an individual
switch health insurance plans [82]. The loss of a job can result in switching health
insurance. Health insurance companies may disappear through mergers, acquisitions,
or bankruptcy, thus requiring patients to switch health insurance plans.
Employees switch insurers when they change employers. This is true not only in
the U.S. employer-based sector, but indirectly the situation is the same in the
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Netherlands today where they may, however, join the purchasing group at their new
job if they wish. In the Netherlands about half of the population has chosen group
health insurance coverage organized around their employment (this is not organized
by the employer). Each year in the U.S. about 30% of employers (those who do not
self-insure) cancel their contract for employee health insurance [13]. These
employers do the ‘‘switching’’ for their employees. In some instances they cease to
offer insurance altogether.
High insurance turnover rates for specific companies or industry sectors result in
‘‘under-investment in health,’’ ‘‘less preventive care’’ and ‘‘higher medical
expenditure in retirement’’ which lead to inefficient health investment at the
societal level [24]. When employers in the U.S. change health insurance plans,
employees are involuntarily switched and this has negative health consequences [32,
36], including poorer outcomes for diabetes management. This is assumed to be the
case because the health benefit ‘‘payoff’’ for proper treatment for diabetics is long
term. Therefore, it does not receive the attention it deserves if health insurance
policies are short-term [26]. If an insurance company raises its rates this may mean
that an enrolee must switch plans or drop health insurance altogether with serious
health consequences [32]. The same is true when commercial health plans exit a
market, something that is common in the U.S. [59].
Accounting for Switching Behaviour
What motivates switching behaviour or its absence? What factors mediate these
choices? Some of the same variables that explain initial health plan choice also play
a role in future switching [74]. In both cases an individual’s initial health plan
choice and subsequent switching are influenced to some extent by price, quality,
choice of provider, benefit design, coverage, ease of use, demographics, and health
status [77]. But the extent to which this is the case is not always clear.
Classic economic theory predicts that pricing will influence switching in many
cases and this is certainly observed in the health insurance market [1, 16, 83]. It is
true for members and retirees of the Federal Employees Health Benefits program in
the U.S. [5, 28, 35]. Younger and healthier individuals are more likely to be
influenced by price when switching than those who are older or ill [66, 84]. Newly
hired employees in the U.S. are more sensitive to price differences than those
already enrolled [78]. There is evidence that many employees switch when offered
cheaper policies options by their employers, if the difference is actually worth the
trouble of switching in terms of time and administrative hassle [9, 78]. In the U.S.
price increases have been observed to increase member switching among Medicare
managed care options [62]. But in the Medicare Part D Plan for pharmacy benefits
most seniors have proved incapable of seeking out, enrolling in, or switching to ‘‘the
lower-cost Part D Plan available to them’’ among equivalent choices [38]. When
price fails to influence consumer switching behaviour it can be very frustrating for
policy makers who strive to design health systems that encourage critical consumer
behaviour. Interviews with the Minister of Health in Switzerland indicated that
‘‘despite as much as $1000 Euro differences, some citizens do not switch to cheaper,
but identical health insurance plans’’ (Personal interview of one of the authors with
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Ministry of Health officials, Berne, June 4, 2008). That said, research suggests that
in most cases when price differences are very large, switching does indeed increase
in Switzerland [31]. Price, however, is not the determinant in all instances, and
behavioural economics offers promising insights that complement more traditional
economic explanations [66].
Quality of health care is complex, difficult to measure and has been found to
influence consumers in the laboratory setting more than in the real world [77]. Some
studies suggest that quality information is not necessarily a reason for switching [1]
though other studies report a small effect of providing quality ratings to employees
[6]. For example, published quality information and ‘‘report cards’’ have little
influence on consumers [41, 44, 73]. The number of services offered may be
important as a surrogate for quality in motivating patients to switch plans [77]. In
any case, switching provides little assistance in assuring quality for the sickest
patients [75]. Only a minority of consumers in the U.S. (14%) have encountered and
employed quality information about insurance plans, doctors or hospitals; that
proportion has declined of the last 10 years [40]. At least one very successful health
system, Switzerland, does not make quality data available to consumers [65],
suggesting that the Swiss government assumes the responsibility of assuring high-
value services along with other regulatory duties. When forced to use quality data,
or paid to do so, in the laboratory consumers made better choices and switched plans
according to rational motivation. Patient choice of primary care physician is most
often based on subjective measures such as satisfaction and interpersonal interaction
rather than any objective quality assessment [25].
In theory, employers make quality choices for their employees, switching health
insurance providers for them. However, in the US quality has not been found to be an
important criterion for employers to purchase health insurance plans for their
employees; their main criteria when choosing one insurance company over another, is
price [72]. But even this price competition does not necessarily make for much
increase in market efficiency. Any gains from price competition could be offset by
additional administrative expenses, because of the high costs of marketing to different
groups with different instruments. This marketing is especially expensive if it involves
selling different products to various segments of the population (age, gender,
education level, psychological orientation, attitudes, lifestyle choices, etc.). Pricing
strategies and customer retention strategies are other instruments for health plans
designs [49]. While central to the market model of health insurance, switching health
plans is not entirely positive from a public health point of view [3, 86]. This is the case
in countries where switching reduces continuity of care and fails to encourage health
services that lead to health improvement in the long term. In some countries switching
has been reported to have substantial adverse clinical implications with health system
cost effects, especially in the first year. These negative effects include a reduction in
preventive care, a decline in cost-effective screenings, an increased chance for
avoidable hospitalization, and overall higher health care expenditures [11, 10, 26, 27,
32, 36]. Their findings have implications, as well, for policy regarding employer-based
health insurance in the U.S. where inefficiency due to switching is not trivial [13].
Researchers report that the higher the satisfaction level, the less likely employees
are to switch, especially if they have family insurance coverage [9]. While there is
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some evidence that a general dissatisfaction with services is an important incentive
to switching [51], dissatisfaction does not necessarily or consistently lead to
switching health plans [1]. However, in the 1990s three-fourths of switching in the
U.S. state of Utah was found to be due to dissatisfaction with a consumer/patients’
HMO [82]. The now classic Rand Study in the U.S. found that for mental health
providers, high patient satisfaction was consistent with an absence of switching
[79]. Fondacaro et al. [29] found greater patient satisfaction when health insurer
decisions met consumer’s needs and when decision making was based on equity
considerations. If there is a serious problem with the services offered or if customer
service staff are ineffective patients will switch [57].
Switching health insurance plans incurs ‘‘costs’’ to the consumer, sometimes
called ‘‘transaction costs’’ and these too, may encourage or discourage change [39].
Time is valued and the transaction costs associated with switching health insurance
plans are always part of the decision to act. This is the case across many countries
and states within the U.S. [82]. The transaction costs of switching health plans are
also a function of the complexity of choice in the health insurance sector. For
example, in Chicago, Illinois, the Medical Director of Blue Cross Blue Shield
insurance company, Allan M. Korn, MD, reports that there are over 17,000 health
plans in the health marketplace [45]. In these cases transaction costs may discourage
rational switching to a greater degree than where there are fewer choices. Dr. Korn
suggests that everyone seems to ‘‘want their own plan design’’. The high costs of
switching, in terms of the time it takes to do so, have also been documented in non-
health sectors including the residential electricity market. Here switching has
sometimes been associated with an actual ‘‘loss in value’’ because of consumer’s
inability to choose wisely. Some consumers ended up paying more than they would
have if they had not switched [87]. Still, the highly educated and people with a
higher income might be less risk adverse and probably more experienced in
processing relevant information concerning health plans, thereby decreasing the
transaction costs [39].
Switching may be mediated by psychological and emotional factors rather than
the result of rational calculation. Decisions that are important to individuals and that
have a highly charged emotional aspect involve a great deal of personal
interpretation because it is not a matter of a right or a wrong outcome [69].
Certainly some individuals welcome the opportunity to assess and switch health
insurance plans. But others experience the ‘‘endowment effect’’ that leads them to
‘‘overvalue’’ what they already possess [46]. This has been observed with regard to
choice of a physician choice but much less is known about it with regard to health
insurance companies. A related tendency for the elderly to switch less than others is
called the ‘‘fidelisation’’ or loyalty effect in France [37]. Workers in the U.S. are
said to be overconfident and overly optimistic about their own need for health
insurance which distorts their choice when choosing a health plan or switching from
one to another [18, pp. 8–9]). The low amount of switching can also be explained by
the phenomenon that people have a tendency to leave things as they are because
they are afraid to regret the choice they make [2].
It has been shown that changing health insurers is more likely among younger
people, well-educated people and people in relatively good health. Varying
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relationships between switching behaviour and gender, ethnicity and income have
been mentioned.
The differences between groups are mostly attributed to varying switching costs.
These are likely to be larger for individuals with greater health care needs (i.e. older
people and people in poor health, chronically ill people), because these individuals
are especially averse to uncertainty about continued coverage of health care.
Switching health insurance can be the result of calculated anticipation of specific
need for medical care, called adverse selection. This has been documented in the U.S.
[80]; indeed, adverse selection may be somewhat limited to places (such as the U.S.)
where health plans are allowed to offer varying benefits or levels of coverage. For
example, patients switched to plans with maternity benefits in anticipation of having
children [68]. Appropriateness of the benefits package to the individuals needs is also
relevant to the decision to switch. For example, diabetic patients are more likely than
others to switch to health plans with vision care [4]. In a Minnesota (U.S.) health plan,
families with more co-morbidities chose a plan with a higher premium but less co-
insurance and out-of-pocket payments, and the difference of high-premium and low-
premium plans appeared to divide an insured population into risk categories, possibly
affecting insurance options in the future [58]. Again, while adverse selection is well
documented in the U.S. [80], it has not been found to influence switching in France,
where health status does not, in principle, influence choice of health insurance policies
[37]. In some countries, including the Netherland, insurance companies are governed
by guaranteed issue regulations and they receive extra payments from a risk pool if a
disproportionate number of their insured population is very sick. Nevertheless, healthy
individuals have been found to voluntarily switch more than those who are sick in
several countries across several different conditions [6, 16, 62, 67, 79]. The same has
been found for those switching from less generous HMOs to non-HMO private
managed care in the U.S. [42]. Generous benefit packages are widely associated with
switching among the U.S. elderly [4].
Switching can be influenced by structural incentives in a health insurance system.
Debates about financial incentives to switch health insurance plans because of co-pays
and deductibles are ongoing. There are both structural and price related incentives for
switching. The Rand Health Insurance Experiment’s conclusions did not settle the
debate about the reasons for health plan switching; the Experiment’s results are
thought by some to have been affected by attrition bias [61, 63]. The structure of a
health plan, and experience with it, can encourage switching. For example, in the US
about half of enrolees in consumer-directed health plans say they would change back
to traditional health plans if they had the opportunity [50]. There is evidence that
access to an ‘‘open provider network’’ is an important incentive for patients to switch,
especially for older patients [28, 77]. But other studies have found the opposite—this
may not be a reason to leave or stay with an insurance plan [66]. In short, structural
complexity increases the difficulty of switching and seldom makes it easier.
Lessons on Switching From a Case Study in The Netherlands
The Netherlands is an important case for studying switching behaviour and
informing the knowledge because the Dutch insurance system offers the opportunity
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to switch insures at regular intervals. Consumers assume the role of creating a
market for health insurance and only if they are willing to switch for better quality
and/or lower prices will it function as anticipated by policy makers. The 2006
Health Insurance Act united the two health insurance systems, one private and one
public, into a single compulsory, private insurance system. It broadened options for
individuals to choose among insurance plans offered by private companies,
establishing an annual open-enrollment period [53].
The government role was reduced to that of an umpire with the goal of ensuring fair
competition among private health insurance companies and protecting consumers
[70]. But individuals were also given the option of joining a group purchasing plan, and
this has proved very popular in the Netherlands for several reasons; some of these were
structural and others were legal in character. The Dutch experience reflects on the
extent to which individuals are critical consumers, and on the nature and motives
behind the decision to switch health plans. First, polls indicated nevertheless, that
consumers in the Netherlands on the whole, had mixed feelings about ‘‘choice,’’ the
obligation to shop critically, and the opportunity to switch health insurance plans on
the basis of price and quality [70]. Second, the population in the Netherlands is highly
educated, and to the extent that switching requires critical evaluation and analysis
skills, the Dutch are an excellent test of this activity. Third, adverse selection as a
motive for switching is less important here because the universal health insurance
system includes community rating, guaranteed issue, and fair risk compensation for
insurance companies [70].
Most importantly the legislation in the Netherlands mandated a substantial cost
reduction for group purchasers of about 10–15% and this proved to change the way
many Dutch purchased health insurance. Many switched to group purchasing
because this would minimize personal transaction costs in making health plan
choices going forward, though this required that the individual remain a member of
the group in the future. The group could as well take on the task of screening for
quality at a given price for its members.
Group purchasers are assumed to have more power than individuals, be it
informal, to require health insurance providers to perform on both quality and cost
[70]. They are financed by employers, unions, patient groups and other consumer
groups, and associations representing the elderly or other groups [53]. These
organizations are inspired by the ambition to be a good employer or to bind their
members [85]. The Dutch Health Insurance Act requires the cost reduction made
available to group purchasers cannot be tied to member ‘‘characteristics’’ but rather
based on the number of individuals in the group to be insured [85].
Methodology
Sampling
In the fall of 2006 a self-administered survey questionnaire was administered to
3856 citizen-residents of the Alkmaar region of the Netherlands (ages 19–65). It was
a random sample from the county councils in this region north of Amsterdam. The
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study was part of a health monitoring project consisting of consecutive health
surveys taken every 3 years. Questions about health plan switching were only
included in the 2006 questionnaire after the Dutch Health Care Reform. The
response rate was 73% (n = 2836). Forty-five respondents were excluded because
they failed to respond to a high proportion of the questions. This left 2,791 for
analysis. The results were representative of the total population although consumers
aged 50 years and over were slightly overrepresented as was the case with women.
The questionnaire included a range of questions about respondents’ health, health
care and consumption of health services as well as socio-demographic variables.
Respondents were queried about switching health plans. They were asked: ‘did you
switch recently to another health plan?’ (Yes/No). There were also asked what
reasons they had for doing so (purchasing group, utilization of internet information,
advice of relatives, etc.). Non-switchers were asked about the reasons they had for
remaining with their health plan (purchasing group, satisfied with current health
plan etc.).
Data Analysis
Comparisons between groups were made utilizing Chi-square tests and Cramers
V tests for categorical data. Switching was considered to be a nominal variable. The
differences were considered significant if p-values were \0.01. For statistical
analysis, SPSS 15.0 for Windows (SPSS, Chicago, IL) was used. In line with a
previous study [66] discriminant function analysis was performed to discover
variables which explain the principal differences between switchers and non-
switchers. Discriminant function analysis is employed here as a multivariate
technique for nominal data and especially useful for statistically distinguishing
between two or more groups, rather than for classification purposes [55]. Rao’s
V was used as the stepwise criterion [55]. Purchasing group, utilization of internet,
marital status, gender and age were the discriminating variables.
Results
Table 1 presents a description of the respondents in the Health Survey.
Table 1 Respondent
characteristics (N = 2791)
Variable Percentage
Age
19–34 29.6
35–49 37.1
50–64 33.3
Men (%) 49.8
Married (%) 65.4
Very good or good subjective health (%) 81.7
Health Care Anal (2011) 19:312–328 321
123
Results indicated that 29% (n = 823) of the respondents changed their health
insurance plan in 2006. This was higher than in the country as a whole (21%) during
that year, but variations between geographical regions was expected and this does
not affect the results of our exploratory study which represents the regional
population sampled.
Joining a purchasing group was mentioned by the switchers as an important
consideration for switching. Satisfaction with the current health plan was listed by
the non-switchers as an important argument for staying with the health plan.
Younger people switch more than the elderly, but this result was not significant.
Women were found to be more likely to switch than men. Those living together with
a partner were found to switch more than consumers living alone. Consumers with
higher levels of education were somewhat more likely to switch than those with
lower levels of education. The healthy were found to switch significantly more than
the less healthy but the outcome was not strong. This greater tendency to switch was
also found with those frequently visiting the doctor compared to those who rarely
saw their doctor: the result was not statistically significant.
In the Netherlands access to quality information about health plans via the
internet is widely available to assist consumers in making choices about health
insurance, including the decision to switch health plans. There is a modest
association between the utilization of internet resources and health plan switching
with users more likely to switch than nonusers. Quality and price information
available on the internet may have influenced the switching choices of high internet
users (Table 2).
Another variable appears to be more important than nay others in accounting for
switching health plans. Table 3 displays switching to a group purchasing plan from
an individual plan. A strong association (V = 0.43, P \ 0.01) is observed between
the purchase of a group plan and switching. Respondents who mention purchasing
groups as a rationale for switching were more likely to report switching their health
plans than those who did not mention purchasing groups as a rationale for switching.
Discriminant function analysis reveals the relative order of importance of the
several variables in our study. This analysis (P \ 0.01) of the data allows us to
Table 2 Associations between
several variables and switching
health insurance plans
(N = 2791)
Variables Results
Age Not significant
Gender v2 = 8.38, df = 1, P \ 0.01
Cramers V = 0.06
Living status v2 = 35.90, df = 4, P \ 0.01
Cramers V = 0.11
Education level v2 = 37.05, df = 3, P \ 0.01
Cramers V = 0.14
Perceived health v2 = 12.57, df = 4, P \ 0.01
Cramers V = 0.07
Visiting the doctor Not significant
Utilization of internet v2 = 35.9, df = 1, P \ 0.01
Cramers V = 0.11
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reject the hypothesis that consumers actively seek information when switching
(Table 4).
Factors are listed according to relevance. Membership in purchasing groups, not
individual shopping based on internet information, was the most important factor in
a model that explains 21% of the observed variance in switching health plans.
Living status is related to joining a purchasing group: those living with a partner,
because they are eligible to join the plan of their partner, have more opportunities to
join a purchasing group than those living alone. Therefore, not surprisingly, living
status is the second factor in explaining the switching behavior. Education level was
not decisive in explaining the principal differences between switchers and non-
switchers.
Discussion
Overall, in the Netherlands switching appears to be motivated by pragmatic reasons
as much as by purely rational-calculating processes though the two are difficult to
separate. The reduced transaction cost for individuals, the lower prices, and the hope
for better quality care that is associated with group plans may have inspired many to
switch health plans in the Netherlands.
Our study confirmed the results of other studies [39] showing that the well-
educated and the healthy are more likely to switch to another health plan. We could
not confirm a role of age. Gender and living status have been shown to be a factor,
but joining a purchasing group was by far the most important variable.
Switching to a group plan is not without costs in the Netherlands. Lower
individual satisfaction, perceived unfairness, and involuntary future switches
initiated by the group, may have to be balanced off with the advantages of group
purchasing. It is not exactly clear what motives consumers have for joining a group.
Table 3 Percent switching
health plan by percent
membership in a purchasing
group (N = 2791)
Health Plan
Switching
Membership of a purchasing group as a rationale for
switching (non) decision
Yes No Total
Yes 58.8 16.4 29.1
No 41.2 83.6 70.9
Table 4 Discriminant function
analysis for health plan choice
(N = 2791)
Variable Step Significance Rao’s V
Purchasing group 1 0.00
Living status
(with partner or alone)
2 0.00 37.2
Gender 3 0.00 42.1
Utilization of internet 4 0.00 65.9
Education level 5 0.00 86.5
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It might be the expected lower premium, but joining a group is also optimal if it
means that the purchasing decision, including switching, is made for the group by a
highly qualified agent who consults quality ratings and takes relative price for value
into consideration.
As reported in our literature review above, individual consumers often make poor
decisions when switching for a variety of reasons including the high ‘‘costs’’ of
assessing alternatives. Group purchasing resolves some of the dilemmas associated
with choice of health insurance. It may also remove some of the emotional and
psychological difficulties our literature review discussed involved in switching. It
does not entirely reduce the negative consequences involved in switching related to
structural factors that require involuntary switching such as aging, geographic
mobility, etc.
Conclusion
We conclude that there are considerable reasons to doubt that most consumers,
given the opportunity, will switch plans primarily on the basis of critical reflection
and assessment of information about the quality, price, and patient satisfaction. This
outcome is in line with findings from a recent study from the same country showing
that quality of care was not often a reason to switch, but collective offers were [16].
The new data presented here replicates these results and therefore strengthens this
conclusion, thus contributing to further theory development [20]. Most of the
research literature reviewed, though not all, suggest that consumers are not very
good at making rational, carefully calculated switching decisions at this level of
complexity. The assumption that individuals are largely influenced by their
economic interest when switching, and that they will not behave in ways that make
them worse off financially [61] may be the case most of the time but it should not be
assumed to be true in all circumstances.
Rather than embracing the opportunity to be critical shoppers they are more
likely to avoid this role, in the case of the Netherlands, by handing this activity off
to a group purchasing organization. In the new Dutch health insurance system trust
in purchasing groups might be more important than health information from the
internet. This is illustrated by the trend towards lower switching percentages among
the Dutch population since 2006 and increasing relevance of purchasing groups
[15]. Switching insurers may be an important signal to insurance companies that the
insured are dissatisfied with levels of service, quality of care, price, etc. When
switching rates decline dramatically, as has been the case in the Netherlands, it may
indicate a high degree of satisfaction with one’s current insurer or it may suggest
that consumers are failing to play their role as adjudicators between insurers. If it is
the latter then the implications for market based managed competition between
health insurers is worrisome [70]. The market system in the health sector may be
inefficient and challenged by administrative costs that are prohibitive. In addition, it
may signal that more dollars are spent on administration and fewer dollars on
meeting the very real healthcare needs of the population.
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The potential consequences of the limited switching on the part of consumers,
once they have made their initial choice, are important for health systems because
this influences insurer behaviour. Powerful motivators must be found to ‘‘move’’
consumers from the inertia associated with their initial choice. Without such
motivators health insurers are unlikely to invest a lot of effort to capture those few
customers who might switch. Will insurers fall back to a strategy of grasping for
market share without even attempting to compete on price, because price
differentials in the health sector are not large enough to move customers? If this
is the case, then hoped for efficiencies are unlikely to materialize from market
competition in the health sector to the degree anticipated.
Every empirical study involves limitations as does this study. Caution with
respect to results is usually warranted. Some caution with our results is needed. The
sample does not completely represent the Dutch consumer population, since
younger people and males are somewhat under-represented in this study.
Nevertheless, data collection via a self-administered questionnaire is assumed to
have resulted in less bias. The risk of social desirability is reduced by the utilization
of this type of self-administered questionnaire compared to face-to-face interviews.
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